4.8.3.3 Provision Entity

The provision entity has the task to prepare the devices for remote attestation. This makes her the main root of trust. Therefore she has to be trustworthy and she also needs appropriate hardware. Which means that she needs at least HSM (Hardware Security Module). Better she has an access authorisation system for the facilities. To provision devices, the provision entity has to execute the following steps.

  • Get hardware from the hardware manufacturer
  • Get the software from the trusted software source
  • Check the hardware and the software
  • Enable secure boot
  • Generate the attestation data
  • Sell the devices publicly

The first two steps are obvious. Get the hard and software from the corresponding sources. The next step is important. The provision entity has to check, if the hardware is not tampered. Because later, with her signature, she states that the hardware is trustworthy.

The next step is to enable secure boot. This means that the provision entity takes the public key from the trusted software source (the one generated in the MPC process) burn it into the devices. Also eFuses are burnt to harden the device. This step is hardware dependent. In some devices only the hash of this public key is burnt in, but its enough to enable secure boot. In the literature this key is often referred as the vendor key.

Afterwards, the attestation data is made. The provision entity generates with the HSM a per device unique key pair. This key pair is called the Attestation Identifier Key, because it is used to identify the device for attestation. Then also a device unique key called Endorsement Key (EK) is used. The origin of this key is hardware dependent. In some devices this key is already embedded in the device. And in others the key can be chosen and written to OTP (One Time Programmable Memory). Where it is impossible to read it back and only accessible through the on chip crypto engine. The EK is then used to encrypt the private part of the AIK. Then the public AIK and the encrypted private AIK are signed with the provision entity Key (PE-Key). These three parts form the attestation data.

The PE-Key is certified by a root CA and the public part of this key has to be publicly available. The verifier later needs this key.

The attestation data is added to the device. Because the attestation data is not confidential. It can be saved anywhere on the device.

Another important point is that the provision entity has to guarantee that she forget the EK and the AIK. In some devices the provision entity has never access to the EK. This is good nor bad, because it just shifts trust from the provision entity to the hardware manufacturer.

The last step is to sell the provisioned devices to people who want to operate the hardware. They are called members, because they can become a part of the network.